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Abstract
Background: In 2002 Afghanistan’s Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) and its development partners initiated a new
paradigm for the health sector by electing to Contract-Out (CO) the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) to
non-state providers (NSPs). This model is generally regarded as successful, but literature is scarce that examines the
motivations underlying implementation and factors influencing program success. This paper uses relevant theories
and qualitative data to describe how and why contracting out delivery of primary health care services to NSPs has
been effective.
The main aim of this study was to assess the contextual, institutional, and contractual factors that influenced the
performance of NSPs delivering the BPHS in Afghanistan.
Methods: The qualitative study design involved individual in-depth interviews and focus group discussions conducted in
six provinces of Afghanistan, as well as a desk review. The framework for assessing key factors of the contracting
mechanism proposed by Liu et al. was utilized in the design, data collection and data analysis.
Results: While some contextual factors facilitated the CO (e.g. MoPH leadership, NSP innovation and community
participation), harsh geography, political interference and insecurity in some provinces had negative effects. Contractual
factors, such as effective input and output management, guided health service delivery. Institutional factors were
important; management capacity of contracted NSPs affects their ability to deliver outcomes. Effective human
resources and pharmaceutical management were notable elements that contributed to the successful delivery of
the BPHS. The contextual, contractual and institutional factors interacted with each other.
Conclusion: Three sets of factors influenced the implementation of the BPHS: contextual, contractual and
institutional. The MoPH should consider all of these factors when contracting out the BPHS and other functions
to NSPs. Other fragile states and countries emerging from a period of conflict could learn from Afghanistan’s
example in contracting out primary health care services, keeping in mind that generic or universal contracting
policies might not work in all geographical areas within a country or between countries.
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Background
Afghanistan has experienced profound difficulties over
the past decades, especially since the 1978 invasion by
the former Soviet Union which led to political instability,
pervasive conflict and, at times, outright war. In 1992,
the Mujahedeen (groups of religiously-driven warriors)
took power, initiating a new period of civil war and
inter-Mujahedeen conflicts. From 1996 until November
2001, the Taliban emerged as the ruling group in the
country with a limited interest in the development of
health systems [1].
In December 2001, a new democratic government was
established in Afghanistan with international support.
The new government inherited extreme disorder in the
health sector. No policies were in place to guide the deliv-
ery of services and there was a notable lack of coordination
among the many actors working on health. The health
sector was characterized by the absence of infrastructure,
lack of capacity in the public sector, the shortage of health
human resources, and inconsistency in the quality of
services being delivered [2]. Health outcomes were poor
as a result of the disarray: the maternal mortality rate
in Afghanistan at that time was one of the highest in
the world (1600/100,000 live births) and the under-five
mortality rate was one of the worst in the region (257/1000
live births) [2]. Given these challenges, the development of
a functioning health care system, which included a program
that prioritized maternal and child health, was deemed by
the new government to be critically important.
Six months after the new government took power, in
May 2002, the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) estab-
lished a Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) with tech-
nical support from donors and international organizations.
The BPHS was designed to ensure equitable access to a
core set of health services in remote and underserved pop-
ulations. In recognition of the extent of its problems, the
Afghan health sector adopted a new paradigm for opera-
tions. While health care services were regarded previously
as a state responsibility, in 2002 the MoPH and its develop-
ment partners decided to contract-out (CO) delivery of vital
health care services to non-state providers (NSPs) [3]. This
paradigm shift was critically important given that, after
decades of war, the newly-established government did
not have sufficient capacity to deliver health care to the
most underserved in the population.
To rapidly scale up country-wide delivery of the BPHS,
the MoPH needed NSPs [4]. NSPs (both formal and
informal) already provided a wide range of health care
services and had extensive geographic reach. Formal NSPs
such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) had ex-
tensive local networks, roots and experience providing
health services in districts not controlled by the central
government. NGOs—most of which had headquarters in
Peshawar, Pakistan—had trained and supported Afghan
health providers in many provinces and had gained the
trust of communities. These NGOs were well-placed to
assume more responsibility for delivering health care ser-
vices [5].
The MoPH launched BPHS implementation in 2003
with financial support from the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID), the World Bank
(WB), the European Union (EU) and others in the inter-
national community. 31 of 34 provinces were contracted
with NSPs and were supported by different donors. As a
result, different contracting mechanisms were established
to implement the standardized and unified BPHS across
the country. The MoPH served as the steward and owner
of the program.
More than a decade later, the program’s impact was
evident in increased health services coverage (defined in
terms of having a health facility within walking distance),
from 9% in 2002 to 67% in 2015. The country has also
made impressive improvements in health systems perform-
ance indicators including maternal and child health [6–8].
Proponents of contracting out in Afghanistan have
regarded it as effective in rapidly scaling up health ser-
vices throughout the country [5, 9–13] but critics have
expressed concerns about sustainability and cost effective-
ness [14–17]. The factors that have promoted the success
of contracting out to NSPs in Afghanistan are not yet well
understood. Identifying these factors would provide im-
portant lessons for Afghanistan and, more generally, for
comparative studies of health systems in fragile states.
Contracting of health services to NSPs is an increasingly
prevalent trend in developing countries [18]. Loevinsohn
and Harding conducted a comprehensive review of 10 CO
mechanisms in low-resource settings. They found that
the systems for contracting out needed to be adjusted
to address specific needs in each country’s unique context
[19, 20]. Moreover, the authors argue, optimal service
delivery outcomes are likely to result under the fol-
lowing conditions: when the NSP maintains autonomy
from the state; when a focus is placed on outcomes, out-
puts and cost-effectiveness; and when rigorous evaluation
of the contracted-out projects is planned for and con-
ducted on a regular basis.
A few studies have been conducted in Afghanistan on
contracting of NSPs. One review discussed contractual
factors, such as how partners are selected and what pay-
ment mechanisms are used [20]. Though this review
focused on the level of quality of care provided by NSPs,
and identified some factors associated with variations in
quality, it did not explore contextual or institutional factors
related to the contracting structure. The present study aims
to address this gap in the literature on health system devel-
opment in Afghanistan with an in-depth evaluation of the
factors underlying the successes and continuing challenges
facing a health system in transition from post-conflict
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development to long-term sustainability. The main aim of
this study was to identify the contextual, institutional, and
contractual factors that influenced CO of NSPs and their
performance during the period 2003 to 2013.
Methods
Conceptual framework
Our evaluation of Afghanistan’s CO mechanism for BPHS
used a conceptual framework developed by Liu et al. as a
foundation and a guide for designing the study, developing
data collection tools, and analyzing data [21]. Using the Liu
et al. framework provided guidance on methodology. Fur-
ther, it enables comparisons of the situation in Afghanistan
with that of other contracting schemes in other contexts
that have also been assessed using the same framework.
While the specifics of the geographical and historical situ-
ation in Afghanistan are unique, adopting a tested and
proven framework contributes to the validity of the findings
and makes the findings comparable with other situations.
As the Liu et al. framework suggests, this study sought
to develop an overview of the contextual, institutional
and contractual arrangements that have influenced NSP
performance (see Fig. 1) [19, 21]. The study identifies vari-
ous factors. The study also reviews program performance
measures, including “contractual factors”, “contextual
factors” (or the external environment) and “institutional
factors” (such as hiring and retention of staff, and inter-
actions between providers and purchaser). It sought to
capture both intended and unintended effects.
As suggested by Liu et al., the research team conducting
this evaluation was not directly involved in the delivery of
services in the provinces where the research was carried
out. The research team was external to the provinces of
interest, and comprised the primary investigator (PI), three
co-investigators (COI), six field investigators (FI) and one
research coordinator.
In order to represent the varying contexts in Afghanistan,
the research was conducted in six provinces: Balkh,
Bamyan, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, and Nangarhar. Aspects
of the context included the level of security, geographical
features, ethnic variations (i.e. including both Pashtun and
Tajik majority provinces), the donors involved (i.e. The
World Bank, USAID and EU), and implementing NSP
organization.
Data sources
Three main data collection methods were used: desk re-
view, individual interviews and focus group discussions.
Desk review
Our literature review explored a range of documents per-
taining to the research objectives, including addressing
Fig. 1 Study Conceptual Framework (Source: Liu et al)
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critical issues and major policy arguments related to the
role of NSPs in Afghanistan. The desk review incorpo-
rated academic papers, gray literature, reports, and official
policy documents.
Qualitative data collection methods: KI interviews and
FGDs
Liu et al. note that qualitative data provides rich insights
on factors influencing program effectiveness. In line with
this comment, this study involved two qualitative data
collection methods: in-depth interviews with key national
and provincial stakeholders and focus group discussions
with local-level stakeholders. We used a purposeful sam-
pling technique to ensure diversity among our respondents
[22]. The sampling plan was stratified according to different
categories of stakeholders: representatives of the MoPH at
both the central and provincial levels, donors, UN agencies,
NGOs, health care workers, and health professional associ-
ations. The variety allowed the team to explore perceptions
and ideas from a diverse group, identifying similarities and
divergences across the respondent categories.
The stakeholder and focus group interview guides were
developed by the core research team (PI and COIs). The
guides were translated into both the Dari and Pashto lan-
guages and then cross-translated, piloted, and corrected in
order to finalize the study instrument. All interviews and
discussions were conducted in either the Dari or Pashto
language based on participant preference. Transcriptions
were generally made on the same day (or as soon as pos-
sible) by the field investigators (FIs), who used both their
field notes and recordings to ensure accurate transcription
of interviews.
The FIs carried out 36 in-depth interviews and 6 FGDs
across all categories of study participants. By design, we
focused on health workers’ experiences with the contract-
ing out mechanism; no patients or beneficiaries were in-
cluded in the study. Table 1 lists all types of interviewees
and their affiliations. The interviewees for in-depth inter-
views were selected using purposeful sampling that con-
sidered institutional affiliation (i.e. government or NSP),
geographical distribution (representing all the provinces
where the study was conducted), and function in the sys-
tem (policy maker, manager or field level worker). Inter-
views were conducted at the respondents’ workplaces or
other locations where the participants felt comfortable.
The participants for the FGDs were also selected through
a purposeful sampling process that sought to keep the
composition of the FGDs constant across provinces. The
members of each FGD were recruited based on predefined
criteria and in collaboration with local health authorities.
Characteristics of FGD participants are summarized in
Table 2. The FGDs were conducted in neutral settings
where the participants could freely express themselves.
The FIs who collected the data were recruited and
trained in March and April 2016 by the PI and COIs.
The field work, led by the PI and coordinated by the re-
search coordinator, was conducted in June and August
2016. Only the research team had access to the data col-
lected and all interviews and FGDs were assigned codes
to preserve anonymity when citing quotations.
Data analysis
Interview transcriptions and field and diary notes were
included in the data analysis. We used content analysis
to consider the key issues, elements and outcomes [23].
Topics and concepts were identified, highlighted and placed
in categories of association. Themes and statements were
coded according to the conceptual framework. Representa-
tive quotes were selected and allocated to the relevant
classifications. Common viewpoints were described, and
particularly important responses were elucidated. Finally,
each category was studied and discussed by the research
team to develop interpretations of the data that addressed
the aims and objectives of the study.
Findings from the interviews and FGDs were triangulated
with other data sources in four ways. First, the research
team assessed the consistency of the findings generated
using the different data collection methods. Second, we
examined the consistency of different data from the same
method. For instance, we compared multiple sources’ per-
spectives about the procurement of medical supplies, a
topic we discussed with donors, MoPH policy makers and
NSPs. Third, multiple analysts reviewed all findings. Fourth,
we used various perspectives and theoretical frameworks
when interpreting the data. In all cases we made sure that
the personal opinions of the research team members were
not reported as part of the results.
Combining multiple observers, theories, methods, and
data sources helped to avoid problems created by collecting
data using only a single method or from only one source.
The breadth of perspectives included in the analysis allowed
us to comprehensively assess the program and isolate
the impact of CO. This was frequently difficult, given
the prevalence and severity of problems such as those
posed by the environment in parts of Afghanistan [21].
Results
The results of the study are presented in line with the
study’s main objective: to understand the key contextual,
contractual and institutional factors that have influenced
contracted NSPs’ performance in delivering the BPHS in
Afghanistan. These factors are presented in brief in
Table 3. Each factor is discussed in detail in the follow-
ing sections.
The Liu et al. framework proposes that creating an im-
pact on the health status of a population through con-
tracting out depends on the interplay among three types
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Table 2 Sampling frame for focus droup discussions
Institution Participant Number (n) Reason for Selection
MoPH Preventive Health Care (PHC) Officer 1 Is aware of all the contractual and service delivery programs in the province
HMIS Officer 1 Responsible for collection of data from all health facilities at the provincial
level and relaying it to central HMIS in Kabul; collects all indicators of BPHS
on a monthly basis
Reproductive Health Officer 1 Provides technical perspective on components of BPHS related to maternal
and child health services
Expanded Program of Immunization
(EPI) Officer
1 EPI is the largest health program in the country; officers are experienced
and familiar with NSP service provision
NSPs Deputy Project Manager 1 Oversees monitoring and evaluation of all programs under contract
Finance Manager 1 Manages inputs and financial mechanisms of NSPs; understands provider
payment mechanisms
Community Supervisor 1 Provides views from community and frontline health workers
Table 1 Smpling frame for in depth ke informent interviews (KIs)
Institution Person(s) to be Interviewed Number (n) Reason for Selection
Central Ministry of Public
Health (MoPH)
Deputy Minister of Policy
and Planning
1 One of four people at MoPH who initiated
the contract-out mechanism and continues
to oversee the provision of health services
by NSPs
General Director, Policy
and Planning
1 Has essential information on contextual,
contractual and institutional standards
and variations
Head of Health Management
Information System (HMIS)
1 HMIS manages self-reported data from the
NSPs on a monthly basis; the department has
been involved since the start of the BPHS
Head of Monitoring & Evaluation
(M&E)
1 The department works with the third-party
evaluator to develop and oversee the BSC
Head of Grant and Contract
Management Unit (GCMU)
1 GCMU was created specifically for the purpose
of facilitating the contracting process; manages
procurement, contract management and
compliance evaluation of the NSPs for
implementation of BPHS
Provincial Liaison Director 1 Responsible for coordinating provincial-level
activities; can provide detail on provinces
Provincial MoPH Provincial Health Directors 6 (one per province,
six provinces)
Provide key information about the context,
type of contract and institutional factors for
the respective provinces
Third Party Evaluator (Johns Hopkins
University and Indian Institute for
Health Management and Research)
Evaluator 1 Assessed the performance of BPHS across the
country from 2004 to 2013, applying BSC and
conducting household surveys
Donors (USAID, WB, EU) Health team leaders 3 (3 main donors) Represent the interests and opinions of the
three main donors supporting the CO program
Non-state providers (NSPs) NSP Managers, Kabul (national
and international NGOs)
6 (one per province,
six provinces)
Understand the type of contract in their province;
provide key information about contractual
arrangements, context and institutional factors
Provincial NSP managers 6 (one per province,
six provinces)
Province-specific input to contextualize
information and get field-level knowledge
about each contracted NSP
Heads of health facilities 12 (two per province,
six provinces)
Views of frontline health workers on CO and the
contractual, institutional and contextual variations
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of factors: contractual, contextual and institutional [21].
When these three sets of factors interact effectively, the
health system produces better outcomes, namely: quality,
access and coverage of health services. These, in turn, com-
bine to produce the final goals: improved and equitable
health status of the population. For example, favorable con-
textual factors pave the way for a better contractual mech-
anism to function, which in turn smooths potential pitfalls
faced by the institutions involved. The interactions among
the three types of factors are therefore as centrally import-
ant as identifying and categorizing the factors. These inter-
actions are depicted in Fig. 2.
In the following sections we describe how each factor
contributes to improving the performance of the CO
mechanism for NSPs contracting-out. We then discuss
how their interaction produces impact.
Contextual factors
Contextual factors include any conditions that create either
a conducive or unfavorable environment for an effective
program of contracting-out. In Afghanistan, the socio-
cultural and geographic factors were long-standing con-
ditions. On the other hand, the political changes that
followed the fall of the Taliban created a new legal and
policy foundation for contracting out. Table 4 summarizes
the contextual factors that emerged from the study data.
Sociocultural norms
Sociocultural norms at provincial level were identified
by all categories of participants, from policy makers at
the MoPH to donors to provincial- and field-level health
workers, as a key factor influencing the delivery of health
services [MoPH-02][DPR-01][HW-07][PPHD-07]. For ex-
ample, in some provinces it is culturally unacceptable for a
male health worker to examine a female patient. Coupled
with a relative lack of women with higher education, lead-
ing to a shortage of local female health workers, this situ-
ation compromises health care access for women. In other
provinces, different sociocultural rules about female mod-
esty and gender apply. In these provinces, socio-cultural
norms allow women to be examined by male health
workers and as a result, women have better access to health
care regardless of educational level. For instance, in Bamyan
women actively participate in the health care system, which
is functioning. Women provide some health services, and
female and male health workers working together is the
norm. In other parts of the country, such as Nooristan, this
would not be considered culturally acceptable, requiring a
different health system structure [MoPH-02].
Fig. 2 The interaction of contextual, contractual and institutional factors and their relationship with the outcomes
Table 3 Factors Assessed in this Study
Category of Factor
Contextual Contractual Institutional
• Sociocultural environment • Contractor selection External:
• Performance monitoring
• Political environment • Contract duration
• Legal and policy environment • Contractual requirements
• Geography • Types, formality and duration of services to be provided Internal:
• Inputs, outputs and outcomes
• Payment mechanism
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Political and security factors
Successful leaders are marked by their ability to main-
tain close relationships with local people and agencies
[24]. The level of, capacity at, and structure of, the pro-
vincial health department was mentioned by participants
as a key element affecting the delivery of health services
in general, and contracted-out services in particular. Par-
ticipants’ views were similar at the central and provincial
levels. For instance, policy makers in Kabul felt that a
provincial health director could facilitate better provision
of health services by NSPs by making resources available
and promoting the success of health service delivery
efforts [MoPH-02]. The capacity and structure of the
provincial health department is linked to other provincial
leaders such as political figures, influential local residents
and the provincial governor. However, all participants
described unwanted political interference in decisions re-
lated to the delivery of health services, such as choosing
where to deliver services, pushing for the hiring and firing
of certain health workers or contracting with specific
companies for logistical support. One respondent stated:
Sometimes the politicians interfere [with the
implementation of the health services]. They
recommend to the NGO an irrational establishment
of a health center. [As a result] underutilized clinics
are created due to political reasons. The CHC
[Comprehensive Health Center] is established but
population around it is not sufficient [to reach the
targeted number of clients]. [DPR-01]
Political interference has proven a key challenge to con-
tracting out programs, as NSPs have to work with local offi-
cials, warlords, members of Parliament and other influential
members of the community on a regular basis. [MGR-03].
Provision of services by NSPs was also considered a chal-
lenge to government authority. Several provincial govern-
ment officials interviewed reported that the CO mechanism
has undermined the role of the government in service
provision, consequently calling into question the legitimacy
of the government. Government officials expressed concern
that the population only perceives that the services are
provided by NSPs and does not understand the govern-
ment’s role in providing health care services [PPHD-06]
[PPHD-04].
Respondents in all categories unanimously stressed
that security is an essential factor in creating an enab-
ling environment for the effective provision of health
services by NSPs. Respondents from Nangarhar and
Kandahar expressed the most concern about security.
Insecurity is debilitating to the delivery of health care.
Several interviewees described the impact of worsening
security in some provinces after 2007. Increasing insecurity
in these areas affected both the delivery of services and re-
duced the ability of the MoPH to conduct monitoring and
supervision [MoPH-02]. Those NSPs with long-established
relationships with local communities have generally
managed to continue delivering services even in areas
controlled by anti-government groups, although many
incidents were mentioned when clinics had to close, or were
even attacked, during a local conflict. A respondent from
one of the least secure areas summarized the problem:
War, and the local situation, have huge impact on
[health services]. If somewhere there is war and the
situation is not normal then an NGO can’t find
qualified staff and can’t provide [health services].
[PPHD-06]
Geography
Geographical features also have a significant impact on
the reach and effectiveness of health services. Each
province of Afghanistan has distinct geographical char-
acteristics that affect the distribution of health facilities
and provision of health services. It is particularly diffi-
cult to guarantee regular supplies of medicines and
medical equipment in hard-to-reach areas in mountain-
ous regions. The difficult geography is compounded by
challenges created by the climate. NSPs have to plan
ahead to maintain services during often long periods of
road closures in winter.
Table 4 Summary of contextual factor findings
Contextual factor Features (positive (+) or negative (−) impact) affecting contracting-out
Sociocultural environment • Ethnic and religious traditions and cultures (+/-)
• Traditional gender constructs (−)
• Social capital and culture of community participation (+)
Political, policy and legal environment • Capacity and structure of provincial health departments (+/-)
• Influence of political leadership on hiring of staff and implementation of services (−)
• Conflict and insecurity (−)
• MoPH and central government’s enabling legal and policy environment (+)
Geography • Accessibility of health services to population (+/-)
• Willingness of health professionals to serve in remote/insecure areas (+/-)
• Ease of access for supplies (+/-)
• Ease of access for monitoring (+/-)
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Many NSPs, therefore, prefer to provide services in re-
gions that are easier to access. NSPs with contracts to
deliver health services in regions with harsh geography
need to develop innovative strategies, in particular to
incentivize recruitment and retention of health profes-
sionals willing to work in difficult conditions. Several par-
ticipants from NSPs mentioned instances when they had
to offer more benefits to get staff to accept positions in
hard-to-reach areas. This was particularly the case for
female doctors, whose packages might include also hiring
the doctor’s husband, providing hardship payments and
offering special vacation opportunities [PMGR-03]. One
participant described that:
NGOs’ salary rates are according to geographical
grading. It’s different in different provinces. The
hard-to-reach areas and conflict-affected areas have
more salary. [HW-303]
Contextual factors lay the foundation on which insti-
tutional responses are built and in terms of which the
contractual factors are defined.
Contractual factors
The category of contractual factors includes various aspects
of the contracting mechanism: types of services covered,
contract formality, contract duration, contractor selection,
specifications of requirements, processes of contract imple-
mentation, output and outcome indicators and finally the
contract payment mechanism.
Types of services
Respondents were generally able to describe the main
types of services contracted out by the government to
NSPs (including BPHS and the Essential Package of
Hospital Services (EPHS)) and those provided directly
such as provincial hospital services. One focus group
agreed:
[The] Basic Package of Health Services provided in
[our] province includes all the BPHS components,
such as maternal and neonatal health services,
immunization and child health services, public
nutrition, control of communicable diseases services,
mental health and disability health services, and
pharmaceutical services. There is also EPHS, which
provides secondary health services through the
regional hospital in [a neighboring] province. The
EPHS is a contracting-in mechanism in [our]
province. [FGD-02]
Some respondents also mentioned contracting of cap-
acity building programs and research projects.
Contract formality
MoPH policy makers expressed generally favorable per-
spectives on the contracts in the CO mechanism. Several
respondents mentioned that the selection process estab-
lished for CO and the creation of the Grants and Con-
tracts Management Unit (GCMU) have become examples
that other national sectors seek to follow [MoPH-02]
[PPHD-02]. From the outset, the BPHS program has em-
phasized formality in its contracts. They require NSPs to
abide by all governmental laws (after undergoing a rigor-
ous selection process). These strictures enabled the NSPs
and the government alike to trust each other, and fostered
reliability of the services.
Contract duration
Both NSP managers and MoPH officials interviewed noted
that contract durations differed by donor, and that con-
tracts were commonly extended beyond the original
contractual agreement. While the initial contract dura-
tions ranged from 18 to 36 months (with an average of
26 months), extensions lengthened them. One MoPH
official explained:
[The durations] are different, normally between two
and three years. But these [contracts] were extended.
Even if it is for three years, it is subject to the
evaluation by the [third party] organizations.
Performance review is a condition for the extension.
There were extensions up to five years. The PCH
[partnership contracts for health], for instance, started
in 2009 and in the second year it was evaluated and
extended to the third, and finally it was extended to
five years. The small project [non-BPHS] did not last
more than six or seven months. [MOPH-02]
Respondents had mixed reactions towards the extensions.
Some argued that the extensions of contracts had a positive
effect on service delivery by preventing disruptions that
would occur with another long tendering process. This
view was supported by NSPs, who stressed that the longer
an NSP worked in a given location, the stronger their
relationship with the community [PMGR-02]. However,
others presented a different viewpoint. This view was
widely expressed by provincial MoPH authorities, who
reported that following an extension the NSPs tended
to relax, undertaking fewer quality improvement efforts or
innovations [PPHD-05]. Another concern raised about
contract extensions was that they reduce competition,
undermining its benefits.
Contractor selection and parties to the contracts
Funding for the contracts comes from multiple donors
with the MoPH now serving as the purchaser; in the
earlier stages of the CO program, donors interacted
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directly with NSPs believing that the government lacked
the requisite capacity for financial management and pro-
curement. Indeed, some donors temporarily used their
own mechanisms for procurement of NSPs until the
government’s procurement capacity was ready to man-
age a large program like the BPHS [PPHD-01]. Once the
MoPH had developed the capacity to handle procurement
for large scale programs, a unified system was developed
with the leadership of the MoPH. This transition occurred
gradually, beginning with the 2003 transfer to GCMU of
contract management for all the World Bank funded
provinces. In 2010 USAID delegated its contract manage-
ment to the MoPH, as did the EU in 2013 [5].
The study reviewed the contract specifications from
the MoPH. According to these documents, the process
for contracting out to NSPs is well-designed and clear.
The process is governed by the MoPH with active partici-
pation from relevant stakeholders, including provincial
health directors. A selection committee (GCMU officers,
provincial health director, UN agency representative and
MoF representative) reviews and awards contracts, while
the administrative aspects are managed by GCMU.
While the process seemed clear on paper, interviewees
expressed concerns. Some respondents suggested that there
was little real competition. Some felt that the participation
of provincial health directors was merely symbolic; more-
over, MoPH officials at both central and provincial levels
expressed concern that a small number of Provincial Public
Health Directors (PPHDs) were unable to be impartial.
Specification of contract requirements
BPHS and EPHS documents specify the services to be
provided by NSPs. They detail the requirements for all
processes, inputs and monitoring, as well as targets for
outputs and outcomes. Among our respondents, MoPH
managers, donors and central NSP managers had more
precise knowledge of these details than health workers
and provincial managers.
Implementation of contracted services
The process for implementing health services is specified
by the BPHS implementation guidelines. Each contract
includes a log frame and approved and agreed-on indica-
tors that help guide implementation and monitoring and
evaluation of the performance of NSPs. Thus there is a
common understanding between the government pur-
chaser (MoPH) and the NSP contractors about what
types of services are to be provided and how they should
be implemented [MoPH-03].
In this study, all groups of respondents demonstrated
high levels of awareness of performance specifications
and most discussed performance indicators. The re-
sponses from NSP employees in particular showed that
these indicators play a meaningful role in ensuring that
services are delivered per the plans and expectations of the
contracts [PMGR-01],[PMGR-02],[PMGR-03],[PMGR-04],
[PMGR-05],[PMGR-06].
Output and outcome indicators
Each contract includes specific and clear target output
and outcome indicators. These contribute to transparency
and clarity on how to measure activities and facilitate
quantification of the services provided by NSPs. Output
indicators may include number of health workers trained,
number of health education sessions conducted or num-
ber of institutional deliveries. Output targets are based on
the population of a basic health center (BHC) or clinic
catchment area. Provincial targets are set using provincial
population data. Outcome indicators are captured and
measured separately by third party evaluators using the
Balanced Score Card (BSC). The BSC has six domains
[25]. (Additional file 1 provides information on BSC per-
formance over time for each of the six provinces examined
in this study).
Outputs are the primary focus for USAID-funded con-
tracts, which reimburse NSPs for services delivered. This
payment system facilitates evaluation, as data are reported.
The World Bank -contracts and the current System
Enhancement for Health Actions in Transition (SEHAT)
program, on the other hand, are based on lump-sum con-
tracts and emphasize outcome indicators. One Ministry
official explained:
The three donors have had different performance
indicators. For USAID, input process and output and
outcome indicators were used. We had a datasheet
that contained both output and outcome indicators.
The World Bank had more focus on outcome
indicators and did not emphasize process or inputs.
EU was in between, with a tendency towards
outcomes. [MOPH-02]
Contract payment mechanism
As noted, two mechanisms have been used to pay
contracted NSPs: lump-sum payment and cost-reim-
bursable payment. The World Bank funded projects were
contracts with a lump-sum payment mechanism, as one
respondent described:
The contract was lump-sum, with some flexibility in
movement across the budget lines. The staff is provided
with salary and money for some other items, such as
running cost, maintenance and emergency medicine.
[PMGR-04]
The cost-reimbursable payment mechanism, on the
other hand, is the main model under USAID. In
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USAID-supported provinces, payments were made
based on reported outputs.
The EU contracts fell between the two distinct models.
They were cost-reimbursable, but with a greater focus on
performance outcomes rather than inputs and outputs.
NSPs managers we interviewed expressed preferences
for the lump-sum mechanism, which they see as offering
more flexibility and less rigorous reporting and monitor-
ing [PMGR-02, FGD-01]. However, this mechanism risks
making evaluation using reported data more difficult.
Respondents from the government, therefore, generally
preferred a reimbursable mechanism, which entails more
scrutiny and closer supervision of the NSPs [MOPH-02,
PPHD-05].
The choice of payment mechanism can affect perform-
ance. With lump-sum payments, NSPs have more free-
dom in terms of their implementation processes. They
have latitude to initiate innovative approaches to attain
the contractually agreed upon outcomes. However, it also
creates more opportunities to diverge from the contract.
With the launch of the SEHAT program (2013), how-
ever, all payment mechanisms are lump-sum. However,
“lump-sum” may mean different things to different part-
ners. One respondent highlighted this conundrum:
Everyone talks about lump-sum mechanism but still
there is not enough clarity about it. NGOs have their
own definition where they want more freedom and
flexibility, while MoPH has its own definition trying to
make NGOs more accountable. Both parties should
come together and decide what they mean. [MoPH-02]
Frontline health workers understood “payment mech-
anism” in reference to their salaries, regardless of the
contract model used to support the payroll. One provin-
cial worker described:
The payment mechanism for the employees is
working in such a way that first the reports from the
health facilities are collected by the NGO. Then, the
reports are analyzed and the financial report is
prepared and finally, the employee payment is
deposited into their bank accounts on a monthly
basis. In the past, this payment mechanism was
different. The staff payments were processed in the
form of a cash transfer.
The payment systems for employees have evolved. In
the first few years, NSPs determined salaries based on
their budgets. In 2005, a national salary scale was estab-
lished by the MoPH that standardized payments across
the provinces and organizations. Most health workers
interviewed thought that a Results-Based Financing (RBF)
approach would be more appealing than a fixed salary,
because they would get both a basic standard salary and
extra payment based on performance [HW-05].
The contractual factors establish parameters for how
contractors respond to contextual factors, and set limits
within which the institutional factors operate.
Institutional factors
We classified institutional factors in two categories:
internal responses (created by either the purchaser or
the contractor) and external responses [21]. Internal re-
sponses are further divided into three sub-categories: 1)
managing inputs, 2) managing outputs and outcomes, 3)
performance monitoring. External response sub-categories
are: 1) provider market and 2) public service.
Internal institutional factors
Managing inputs, outputs and outcomes
These factors address NSPs’ various approaches to using
the inputs they receive under the contract to implement
health services. Human resources management, our re-
spondents reported, is a pivotal and highly challenging
aspect of contract management for NSPs [MoPH-02,
MoPH-03, PMGR-01, PMGR-02]. While national regula-
tions and contract specifications exist to regulate hiring
(and firing) of staff employed under the contract, some
flexibility exists and further exceptions can be made.
This enables NSPs to avoid lengthy government human
resource management procedures, resulting in more effi-
cient provision of quality health services. The contracts
oblige NSPs to provide a list of key staff to the MoPH in
advance; field officers and health workers must be re-
cruited as soon as possible once the project starts. NSPs
are responsible for filling vacancies and planning cover-
age for staff vacations [PMGR-01].
Health workers’ commitment to the project has been a
persistent challenge. Despite the fact that the number of
health workers trained has increased exponentially in all
categories (doctors, nurses, midwives and others) since
2003, the country continues to face a shortage of health
human resources. NSPs are authorized under their
contracts to offer relatively high salaries based on the
National Salary Policy; however, the rate of staff turnover
was high in some provinces. As mentioned, finding women
to fill key field positions proved particularly challenging for
NSPs [FGD-01].
NSPs described effective and innovative responses to
human resource management issues. One effective strategy
was to hire staff from neighboring countries to be deployed
in Afghanistan. On other occasions, NSPs consulted with
the MoPH to create attractive payment packages for serv-
ing in difficult to reach areas [PMGR-04, HW-10].
Equipment and medical supplies are also critical in-
puts. However, these were less frequently discussed in
our interviews. The importance of on-time and regular
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supply was noted, as was the key challenge with equip-
ment: maintenance. Although biomedical engineers and
companies with post-purchase services are present in
Kabul, they generally unavailable outside the capital city.
Instruments that break down are not repaired in a timely
way, leaving health care providers without important
tools. As mentioned in the geography factors, health
centers located in hard-to-reach terrains also face sea-
sonal challenges, as NSPs must receive sufficient medical
and pharmaceutical supplies to last through the winter
[HW-201] [MGR-01].
Pharmaceuticals are vital inputs to health services. The
availability of medicines in a health facility is one key indi-
cator of functionality; stock-outs limit effectiveness of
health services and undermine patient satisfaction. Respon-
dents reported that the purchase of medicines is a critical
issue in the provision of inputs for NSPs. Two mechanisms
were used for purchasing medicines. One is the centralized
purchasing system recommended under USAID grants. In
USAID-funded provinces, medicines were procured from
internationally accredited companies by Management
Sciences for Health (MSH) or another organization, and
distributed to provinces in response to requests from NSPs.
This model emphasizes ensuring quality of medicines. The
alternative model is a decentralized mechanism that pro-
vides NSPs with funds to purchase medicines directly from
certified pharmaceutical companies according to criteria
provided by the MoPH. This model provides more flexibil-
ity for NSPs and reduces the risk of stock-outs [MoPH-02].
Since all provinces were brought under the SEHAT
project, all medicines purchases are now decentralized.
One respondent, however, felt that the most efficacious
mechanism still needs to be determined. While the vari-
ous donors had different preferences regarding purchas-
ing, representatives of NSPs indicated that they prefer
the decentralized system because it allows them to pro-
cure pharmaceuticals from the local market on a regular
basis [PMGR-09].
Infrastructure is another input that affects the effective
provision of services. Because the construction of new
health centers is expensive, it is generally not included
in NSPs’ proposals. This situation originates from two
flaws in the contracts’ legal framework. First and fore-
most, NSPs seek to minimize costs to reduce the total
budget of their proposals to make them more attractive
bids. Second, the procurement policies of both the gov-
ernment and donors discourage infrastructure develop-
ment. However, in 2003, the USAID provided funding to
construct a large number of health facilities across the
country. Where government facilities are not available to
serve as health centers, some NSPs rent local houses or
other buildings and convert them into health facilities.
This, according to some respondents, is the most com-
mon practice for swift start up.
Performance monitoring
Our interviews found that most stakeholders have a positive
impression of performance monitoring for contracting-out
health services. A national HMIS system and third-party
evaluations are included in the contracts to track input,
output and outcome measures, as well as to assess
overall impact.
The HMIS is based on a set of indicators gathered at
the health facility level by frontline health workers, such
as the number of deliveries that occurred in the health
centers or were assisted by skilled birth attendants and
the number of children vaccinated through routine im-
munizations. However, since the HMIS data are based
on self-reports from providers, their quality and accur-
acy were called into question by some respondents. The
new system for HMIS data verification, which involves a
third party, received positive feedback from some re-
spondents, who indicated that it is helping to improve
the reliability of HMIS data [DPR-02, FGD-01].
A second concern with HMIS data is its usefulness for
decision making. Some respondents mentioned that HMIS
data are indeed informing decision making at different
levels, from the individual health facility to the ministerial
level. One policy area in which HMIS data is considered to
be highly valuable is in the rationalization of distribution of
health facilities. HMIS data provide information to help
assess whether, considering both the investment costs and
the needs of communities, proposed locations or function-
ality levels of new health centers are rational.
Respondents reported that NSPs have also created sys-
tems to utilize collected data in improving the delivery
of health services at different levels. Data collected from
clinics are analyzed and presented back to health facility
managers on monthly and quarterly basis. Any indicators
that have not been achieved are highlighted and corrective
measures discussed. For instance, if the number of deliver-
ies in a facility is low, the NSP conducts a follow-up assess-
ment to understand why. This informs decision making on
how to address problems so corrective measures can be
integrated in the plans for the next cycle.
In summary, the MoPH in collaboration with donors
and its development partners has established a comprehen-
sive, intensive and responsive HMIS to measure and pro-
vide timely feedback on the contracted NSPs’ performance
on indicators. Some concerns remain about the quality of
the data and the efficiency of monitoring and evaluation
(M&E) processes. However, on the whole the system covers
all aspects of the project and is well integrated, thus consti-
tuting the backbone of CO for health services.
External (provider market) responses to the scheme
The CO approach to health service delivery has affected
three provider types: not-for-profit NSPs, for-profit NSPs
and the government. Because health services have been
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contracted out only to not-for-profit organizations thus
far, the first category is discussed in more detail than the
other two.
Not-for-profit NSPs
Most of the interviewees agreed that CO has improved
competition and quality among NSPs delivering health
services in Afghanistan. Previously, each NSP had its own
donors and catchment areas, and they paid little attention
to competing with each other. The advent of the CO
process revolutionized the provider market and drastically
changed the context. NSPs now had the opportunity to
apply for BPHS contracts for specific locations and
periods of time, while the funding from all donors was
aggregated in one basket fund and channeled through
one bidding mechanism.
One positive outcome of the shift to CO has been the
provision of growth opportunities to new and local NSPs.
Local NSPs are increasingly winning bids, as one respond-
ent described:
For example, in the beginning [before the start of
outsourcing health services], there were few
organizations in the health sector [with the capacity] to
manage health facilities, but now by contracting out
there are many local NGOs who could properly manage
around 90 health facilities at a time. [PMGR-06]
Our study revealed two perspectives on the roles of
NSPs in Afghanistan. One perspective expressed by NSP
managers and some MoPH officials focused on the posi-
tive outcomes and impact of health services delivered. In
contrast, however, some MoPH provincial staff expressed
antagonism towards NSPs, referring to cases when NSPs
did not fulfill their requirements effectively or efficiently
[PPHD-05].
Thus while some see the increase in the number of
NSPs as a positive outcome, others remain skeptical and
concerned about having too many NSPs in the market.
The debate is currently of paramount significance, as
local public health departments have begun arguing that
the government should contract with the public health
directorates at the sub-national level, instead of NSPs,
for service delivery. At the same time, debate is occur-
ring at the cabinet level regarding the merits of the CO
process and the option to switch to a contract-in mech-
anism [FGD-01]. One interviewee expressed reservations
about the motivations of some involved in the debate:
I have a concern about PPHDs. Although PPHDs are the
owners of the projects, they have a negative competition
with NGOs [and] they are dissatisfied all the time and
show jealousy towards NSPs because they [PPHDs]
could not implement such projects. [PMGR-09]
Other respondents expressed their opinion that
provincial-level teams should focus on their roles as
regulatory and enforcement bodies, providing leader-
ship and monitoring for BPHS programs rather than
implementation.
For-profit NSPs
BPHS has so far never been contracted out to a for-profit
company or organization, although there is no regulation
against it. The for-profit private sector market has been
affected nevertheless by CO of NSPs. Some respondents
suggested that for-profit companies have been restricted to
providing secondary and tertiary health services in urban
settings because they cannot compete with government-
supported primary health centers in rural areas:
In my province, the for-profit organizations could not
grow because most of the services are provided by
health centers supported by the government and as a
result, there is no place for them. [PPHD-5]
As a result, for-profit health centers remain weak in
provision of primary health services. Other respondents
felt, however, that the private sector has grown stronger
where NSPs failed to provide quality health services. In
these areas, patients seek services from the for-profit
private sector when they are not well cared for or not
satisfied at primary health centers [PPHD-06].
Government’s response
The impact of the CO program on the Afghan government’s
capacity and service delivery arrangements were evaluated
positively by respondents. Interviewees highlighted two
aspects. First, they stated that the program has helped
the MoPH prove itself to be a public agency capable of
managing large projects at the national level. Second,
respondents pointed to improvements made in govern-
ment capacity to conduct procurement and financial
management [FGD-01]. These capacities will enable the
government to continue implementing services into the
future, as one respondent described:
Contracting-out mechanism had its positive impact at
the level of MoPH: its capacity improved in contract
management. This system encourages the government
to improve its capacity to implement [something]
such [as] this project. [PMGR-04]
Some respondents also described how CO has boosted
the economy by providing capacity-building opportun-
ities to health workers, creating jobs, supporting local
pharmaceutical and medical supply markets, and en-
couraging competition among providers. Whether the
government can and should itself become a competitor,
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providing health services is still under evaluation. It
could be a good option in the long run, but for now the
MoPH is successfully supporting NSPs to provide health
services [MoPH-03].
Discussion
The present study offers a theoretically sound and in-depth
qualitative exploration of the contextual, contractual and
institutional factors that affect the implementation of con-
tracting out health services to NSPs. These factors form the
key elements of a framework used frequently for evaluating
contracting of health services [21]. The framework suggests
that interactions among the many factors in the framework
can result in better health care delivery, which in turn im-
proves health impact. This study also did not look at health
impact directly; however, it projects that the collective im-
pact of these and possibly other factors have had positive
impacts on health in the regions of Afghanistan receiving
CO services. Maternal mortality and child mortality rates
improved considerably from 2003 to 2013. The Afghanistan
Mortality Survey (AMS), conducted in 2010, also showed
improvements in the overall health of the population com-
pared to the data from a survey in 2002 [8, 26].
Our findings on how contextual factors affect the con-
tract out process are aligned with others’ findings. Mills
proposed that the social, economic and political environ-
ment can facilitate or restrict a successful CO program
[27]. For example, if the legal system, banking system and
government procedures are weak, contracting will be diffi-
cult [27]. Another study proposed that the state and private
sectors can play an important role in creating a conducive
environment for smooth implementation of contracted-out
services [27]. Our study followed Liu et al. by categorizing
contextual factors into political, geographical, and eco-
nomic and sociocultural factors in the external environ-
ment [21]. We expanded the external environment to also
include climate and security concerns; we recommend that
other researchers applying the Liu et al. framework in a
post-conflict and/or fragile state also expand their focus to
include these or other relevant contextual determinants.
The health care delivery program in Afghanistan was
designed to promote equity, focusing on reaching poor
people and individuals living in remote areas with health
services. However, we found that insecurity (including
risk and fear of violence, being killed or kidnapped, and
the presence of armed conflict in general) was one of the
main factors adversely affecting the CO health services.
Similar trends are reported elsewhere. For example, a study
of post-conflict health reform in Uganda enumerated inse-
curity and lack of institutional capacity as predominant
factors affecting the process of building up the health
system [28]. Newbrander, Waldman and Sheperd-Banigan
emphasized security as a critical determinant for a success-
ful contract-out program [29]. These authors also point out
that conflict areas may require different types of health
services from peaceful areas. Our study supports this: the
full package of health services has been provided in more
secure provinces in Afghanistan, while insecure areas may
only receive emergency services.
In Afghanistan, NSPs were needed to support the urgent
delivery of health services that the government was not in
a position to provide. The legal framework in Afghanistan,
paired with support from the government, enabled the
initiation and implementation of contracting NSPs [30],
although resistance and tension at the outset of the CO
scheme were reported. Newbrander et al. reported that
some NSPs were concerned about maintaining their inde-
pendence [30]; another tension comes from the concern
that there is a dichotomy between state-building and de-
livery of services through NSPs [30].
Institutional factors, such as management of human
resources, also influence the success of CO. Newbrander
et al. described human resource management as a central
aspect of contracting out [3, 5, 9]. They suggested that to
improve human resources requires establishing collabora-
tions with training institutions and transitioning towards
certification/accreditation programs [10]. The shortage of
health workers in all categories was reported as a key chal-
lenge in our study; however, contracted NSPs have coordi-
nated with the MoPH to identify innovative solutions.
Some proved more successful than others—finding female
health workers willing to serve in hardship posts remains
a significant challenge, as is the supply of pharmaceuticals.
The shortage of female health workers has also been de-
scribed by the MoPH and others [3, 5, 9, 31].
NSPs and the MoPH have also collaborated to address
challenges with other institutional factors such as procure-
ment mechanisms. Stock-outs and low-quality medicines
at facilities reduce patient satisfaction and can lead to de-
clines in outpatient visits. Purchasing from local markets
through a decentralized mechanism improves the avail-
ability of medicines but may undermine quality.
Study participants extensively discussed the institutional
approaches to performance monitoring, noting that a sig-
nificant amount of energy and resources are invested in
measuring progress of contracted programs. M&E of the
performance of NSPs contributes to accountability and the
effective provision of services. The government emphasizes
close monitoring of inputs, outputs and outcomes of health
services contracted out to NSPs; NSPs have complied with
these requirements. At central and provincial levels, the
MoPH utilizes various monitoring mechanisms through its
M&E department, the HMIS program and GCMU admin-
istrative procedures. Independent evaluations conducted by
external organizations and based on BSCs are another hall-
mark of the CO program. NSPs have developed their own
M&E systems to comply with their contractual require-
ments [11]. Edward et al. emphasized the pivotal role of
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BSCs in improving transparency, governance and NSP per-
formance benchmarking [32]. The important contributions
of the HMIS in monitoring NSPs’ performance have also
been emphasized by numerous authors over the past dec-
ade [3, 5, 9, 31].
Outside the CO scheme, the health care provider mar-
ket has been affected by contracting out health services to
NSPs. CO created new opportunities and competition on
quality and cost of services among the not-for-profit NSPs
bidding to provide BPHS and EPHS services. International
NSPs have increasingly been underbid by local NSPs,
whose administrative and overhead costs are lower. The
impact on for-profit health care providers seems mixed.
Contracting-out reduced the market share of for-profit or-
ganizations providing primary health services, but private
clinics and hospitals reportedly remain effective in provid-
ing specialized medical services. Contracting out has, as
yet, changed little for the government as a health care pro-
vider. Except in three provinces, the government is not
competing with NSPs to provide primary care.
Liu et al. proposed that contracting out has an impact on
contestability in the provider market, improving the envir-
onment for competition among providers [21]. Our find-
ings concur with this in the case of the not-for-profit NSPs
providing primary health care. For-profit organizations, on
the other hand, focus on secondary and tertiary health ser-
vices [21, 33]. We suggest further research be undertaken
to understand how to better involve the private for-profit
sector in the provision of primary health services.
Key recommendations to policy makers for addressing
all three sets of factors are presented in Table 5.
Limitations
Liu et al. note that systematically understanding the
interaction of factors requires comparators [8]; this was
beyond the scope of this individual country level analysis.
Other limitations related to three aspects of the research
process. The study design focused on collecting and ana-
lyzing qualitative data to generate an in-depth picture of
the contracted health care delivery system in Afghanistan.
Table 5 Recommendations derived from study findings
Recommendations on Institutional Factors
Contract Specification Hire a third-party to conduct evaluation of the intended outcomes
Contract Formality • Include clear selection criteria
• Establish a unit/mechanism to ensure that the criteria are enforced
Payment Mechanism Install a unified and homogenous payment mechanism at the outset
Recommendations on Contextual Factors
Political Context • Foster political will for initiating and enforcing contracting out – this is the single
most important contextual factor
• Ensure that political support and an appropriate legal framework exists
• Develop mechanisms to limit inappropriate interference by local government leaders
Geographical Context Establish a contracting out system that acknowledges, respects and addresses
geographical variations and relevant adaptations
Security Context For a country in a conflict or post-conflict situation:
• Ensure that NSPs fully understand the risks of service provision in insecure areas and
the difficulties likely to arise
• Establish direct and clear communication with all partners and stakeholders on all
sides of the conflict
Recommendations on Institutional Factors
Internal Response: Input, output and
outcome management
• Explore innovative approaches to recruitment of female health workers to address
access issues
• Improve pharmaceutical procurement management and monitoring to avoid stock-out
and low-quality medicines
• Focus on making observable change in the health of communities. Enhance patient
satisfaction by monitoring behavior of health workers and managers
Internal Response: Performance monitoring • Use multiple triangulation methods to assure quality of data
• Establish a single department and system responsible for all performance monitoring
• Align monitoring and evaluation mechanisms among NSPs, government and donors
External Response: Provider market • Develop and implement policies that prevent a few large organizations from monopolizing
health care delivery
• Encourage economies of scale by coordinating multiple contracts to any individual NSP
• Identify strategies to engage the for-profit sector in the provision of health services
Overall • Consider multiple factors when contracting out to NSPs
• Recognize that a universal BPHS policy might not be appropriate across the country;
province-specific criteria could strengthen implementation
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However, the findings could also have been triangulated
with quantitative data, in particular to understand the CO
program’s outcomes.
Execution was limited by insecurity, the geographic size
of the catchment areas and difficulties posed by transpor-
tation. Further, given time and resource limitations, the
qualitative research design used purposive sampling of
provinces and participants in order to capture a breadth
of experiences in terms of payment mechanisms, contract-
ing processes and KIs’ roles. However, we cannot make
claims about how common or widespread any of the per-
spectives were. During data collection, we faced particular
challenges when interviewing PPHDs. In some cases, they
lacked institutional memory about contracting out, while
others were not reachable. In an exceptional case, one
director of health was interviewed while hospitalized and
recovering from a roadside explosion.
Finally, our main objective in this study was to
present a description of the factors influencing a spe-
cific intervention. However, analyzing interactions
among the factors proved beyond of the scope of this
study. Future studies are recommended to delve fur-
ther into this.
Our relatively narrow case study on the BPHS allowed
us an in-depth view of the factors that affect NSPs’ per-
formance. We omitted discussion of the contracting-out
of EPHS or other programmatic, training and research
services. We sought to highlight this gap by mentioning
them in the background section, and recognize that they
present areas for additional research.
Conclusion
Contracting-out to NSPs to provide the BPHS has
been a successful strategy in Afghanistan that is influ-
enced by many factors. We recommend that the
MoPH considers various factors beyond the BPHS
specifications when developing contracts to deploy
NSPs. In particular, a universal BPHS policy may not
work equally well in all provinces. Province-specific
criteria for selecting and contracting NSPs could
strengthen BPHS implementation. In addition, awarding
multiple contracts to a single NSP may lead to a monop-
oly, resulting in inefficiency. We recommend that the
MoPH explores engaging with the private for-profit and
government sectors for BPHS service provision in order
to engage a wider range of stakeholders, with their own
innovative and creative approaches, to reach all Afghan
citizens with accessible quality primary health care
services.
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